The Viability of Economic Shock Therapy in Iraq by Looney, Robert
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2004
The Viability of Economic Shock
Therapy in Iraq
Looney, Robert
Challenge, Vol. 4, No. 5, September/October 2004, pp. 86-103.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/42203
SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2004/$9.00 
THE UNEGUAL SOCIETY 
The War oh Poverty Forty Years On 
Stephanie Bell and L. Randall Wray 
The Long-Term Gender Gap 
Stephen Rose and Heidi Hartmann 
Rising Inequality Not a Surge at the Top 
Lane Kenworthy 
Passing Living-Wage Ordinances 
Oren Levin-Waldman 
Justice and the Global Economy 
Ethan Kapstein 
The Viability of Iraq's Shock Therapy 
Robert Looney 
Challenging the Economic Mainstream 
An Interview with Lance Taylor 
\ 
09 
0 744 79 86806 5 
J 
The Viability of Economic 
Shock Therapy in Iraq 
Robert Looney 
A free market program was imposed on Iraq far sooner 
than the nation was prepared to exploit it. This 
author dis_cusses why it was imposed, and why it may 
have already failed. 
Two QUOTATIONS SUMMARIZE THE POLARIZED VIEWS of development economics today. "If it all works out, Iraq will be a capitalist's 
dream," 1 wrote the Economist last fall. "We suffered through 
the economic theories of socialism, Marxism, and then cronyism. 
Now we face the prospect of free-market fundamentalism," 2 said Ali 
Abdul-Amir, Iraq's interim trade minister, a month later. 
These quotations reflect the expectations and frustrations experi-
enced by both the Americans and Iraqis over the future course of the 
country's economic system. For many in the Bush administration, 
the answer is quite simple: free markets, increased globalization, and 
reduced government interference in the marketplace-the basic 
neoliberal3 economic agenda----are the ticket to rapid Iraqi economic 
recovery and prosperity. For many Iraqis, even some in key minis-
tries, neoliberalism, especially in its "shock therapy" form, is just 
another reckless Western experiment imposed on the country for rea-
sons that are unclear. 
Even in the early summer of 2003, the neoliberal debates were com-
ing to th~ fore: 
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The Viability of Economic Shock Therapy in Iraq 
The big debates will be between those in Washington who want to 
press ahead with a dogmatic neoliberal approach and those in the 
field who see the necessity often for political reasons, to go step-by-
step, acknowledging a large amount of uncertainty about what insti-
tutional changes are necessary or even desired by the Iraqis. On the 
Iraqi side, advocates for the adoption of an Islamic economic system 
will be more and more vocal if the neoliberal reforms do not show 
quick dividends. 4 
The discussion below examines the evolution of neoliberalism in 
Iraq since the summer of 2003. What aspects of the neoliberal agenda 
were introduced into the country? What are their strengths and limi-
tations? Based on this assessment, several conclusions are drawn con-
cerning the applicability of the neoliberal reforms in the Iraqi context. 
The Neollberal Program 
With Iraq's economy still shattered and little recovered eight months 
after the U.S. ouster of Saddam Hussein, the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) ordered a package of reforms reminiscent of the 
"shock therapy" programs carried out in the early to mid-1990s in 
many of the transition economies of central and eastern Europe. 
Overnight Iraq became the most open economy in the Arab world. 5 
While there had been persistent rumors that major free market 
reforms were contemplated, most observers were surprised at the ex-
tent to which they embodied key elements of the neoliberal agenda. 
As the Economist noted, "If carried through, the measures will repre-
sent the kind of wish-list that foreign investors and donor agencies 
dream of for developing markets." 6 The main thrust of the neoliberal 
reforms revolve around five key provisions: 7 
1. Investors in any field, except for all-important oil production 
and refining, would be allowed 100 percent ownership of Iraqi 
assets, full repatriation of profits, and equal legal standing with 
local firms. 
\ ' , 
2. Foreign banks would be welcome to establish operations im-
mediately or to purchase equity shares in existing Iraqi finan-
cial institutions. 
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3. Income and corporate taxes would be capped at 15 percent. 
4. Tariffs were to be reduced to a universal 5 percent rate, with 
none imposed on food, drugs, books, and other humanitarian 
imports. 
5. Although no precise table was set, Iraq's state owned enterprises 
(SOEs), excepting the oil sector, were to be privatized (although 
the method of privatization was not specified). 
Tax treatment in particular is classic application of the neoliberal 
philosophy, sprinkled with a touch of Reaganomics8 thinking. As ex-
plained by Kamel al-Gailani, Iraqi finance minister: "Low tax rates 
that will help create.strong incentives for future investment, employ-
ment, ... limit the size of the public sector, simplicity in order to 
minimize the administrative costs of tax collection, transparency to 
minimize room for tax evasion and corruption, and fairness to en-
sure that all sectors pay reasonable shares of future taxes." 9 
The neoliberal reforms were also complemented by a series of mea-
sures designed to strengthen the country's institutions critical for the 
establishment of a free market economy. Most important in this regard 
were initiatives designed to establish a viable banking sector. The CPA's 
order no. 40 issued on September 19, 2003, defined the rules establish-
ing and governing the new Iraqi banking system and, in so doing, pro-
vided a foundation for Iraq's future economic growth and development. 
The provisions of the bank law were modeled significantly after 
the Western approach to bank regulation. They grant the Central Bank 
of Iraq (CBI) full legal and operational authority. Most importantly, 
the bank law provides the Iraqi banks with the powers and authori-
ties associated with those of modern banks operating in today's in-
ternational financial system. Another notable feature of the bank law 
is the absence of any mention of traditional Islamic banking prac-
tices or activities. 10 
To address many of the problems plaguing the country's commer-
cial banks, the CPA also introduced ,(in September ?003) a new bank-
ing law designed to support the d~velopment of a strong, robust 
banking sector. 11 Under the law: 
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· Domestic banks are required to increase their capital to 10 bil-
lion Iraqi dinars within eighteen months. This is expected to 
encourage consolidation and foreign investment. 
· Banks must maintain long-term capitalization consistent with 
international standards. 
• More rigorous qualifications are set for bank licensing and for 
bank managers and boards of ~irectors. 
Foreign banks may enter the market. The legislation allows for 
six foreign banks to enter the market over the next five years. 
The Central Bank of Iraq, with assistance from the CPA, will 
develop procedures for foreign bank licensing and for estab-
lishing representative offices. 
Central Bank regulations and supervisory capabilities are being 
developed to support the new banking legislation. In addition a new 
currency, the Iraqi dinar, was introduced and the Central Bank given 
independence in its pursuit of a stable monetary and exchange-rate 
policy. 
The reforms clearly incorporate much of the agenda originally 
laid out in the now somewhat discredited Washington Consen-
sus. 12 The main thrust of the Washington Consensus is a set of 
actions that, if taken at an early stage of transition, should facili-
tate a smooth evolution into the world economy. It consists of 
elements of macroeconomic reform (liberalization, stabilization, 
and fiscal austerity) stressing the importance of bringing down 
inflation and establishing economic growth. In addition, it incor-
porates a number of elements of microeconomic reform (e.g. 1 
privatization, promoting FDI), as well as structural/administrative 
reforms (e.g., property rights, ·replacement of q~antitative restric-
tions). Specifically: · · 
• Fiscal Discipline: Limits to budget deficits. 
• Public Expenditure Priorities: Redirect expenditure toward build-
ing human capital and infrastructure. 






• Tax. Reform: Broaden tax base and cut marginal tax rates. 
• Financial Liberalization: Abolish interest rate controls. 
• Exchange Rates: Introduce unified and competitive exchange rates. 
• Trade Liberalization: Replace quantitative restrictions by tariffs 
and then reduce the tariffs over time. 
• Foreign Direct Investment: Encourage increased international capi-
tal inflows. 
• Privatization: Privatize state enterprises. 
• Deregulation: Regulate only safety, environment, and financial 
sectors (i.e., prudential supervision). 
,. 
• Property Rights: Introduce secure enforcement at low cost. 
While progress of reform design and implementation varies con-
siderably by categories, the September 2003 CPA reforms have little 
to say about the first two on the list, no doubt due to the great 
uncertainty surrounding oil revenues, the external debt situation, 
. and foreign assistance. Surprisingly, the last one, property rights, a 
key element of the neoliberal reforms, has received less attention 
than one might have expected. Perhaps the intent of the CPA is to 
simply defer many of the specific legalities to an elected Iraqi 
government. 
This interpretation is lent credibility by the fact that very little has 
been implemented or even discussed in the important areas of the aug-
mented "Washington Consensus" -a set of· complementary measures 
aimed at strengthening supporting institutions: (1) corporate gover-
nance, (2) anticorruption, (3) flexible labor markets, ( 4) World Trade 
Organization (WTO) agreements, (5) financial codes and standards, 
(6) prudent capital account opening, (7) nonintermediate exchange 
rate regimes, (8) independent central banks/inflation targeting, (9) social 
safety nets, and (10) targeted poverty reduction. Of. these measures, 
only some initial, albeit limited, progress has occutred in no. 5 and 
no. 8. Iraq has applied for permission to become an observer, and ulti-
mately a member, of the WT0. 13 
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Reform Skeptics 
Clearly these gaps in the neoliberal model, as applied to date in Iraq, 
cast considerable doubt on the extent to which the country will be 
able to attract investment, both domestic and foreign, to key recon-
struction and development activities. Given that the attainment of 
higher levels of productive investment is· one of the key purposes 
of the neoliberal reforms, serious questions arise as to the appro-
priateness of this approach, espedally in the critical short term, 
when job creation and economic strength are key elements in pre-
paring the country for a successful transition to a stable demo-
cratic government. 
In fact, the neoliberal reforms have come under wide-ranging criti-
cism both inside and outside of Iraq. Skeptics tend to fall in several 
distinct groups: (1) those generally sympathetic with the neoliberal 
approach but feel it is inappropriate in the current Iraqi environ-
ment, (2) those who have serious doubts about the privatization as-
pect of the reforms, (3) those who contend that that while the 
neoliberal approach has merits, other actions and miscalculations by 
the CPA have placed too much strain on the market system for it to 
function efficiently at this point, and ( 4) those who question the 
soundness of the whole neoliberal approach in the context of transi-
tion economies, especially those experiencing internal conflict. 
Neollberal Reforms Inappropriate at This Time 
Typical reservations about neoliberal reforms 14 center around the fact 
that the major thrust of the reforms is to encourage larger volumes of 
productive investment, yet this is unlikely to occur for some time in 
the Iraqi context. The country will simply absorb the pain of the 
reforms, with none of the promised gain. Specifically: 
1. Rampant insecurity is likely to indefinitely deter all but a lim-
ited number of investors, and those are likely'~.o concentrate'on 
quick-profit retail trade. ' 
2. There is great uncertainty over the amounts and actual disburse-
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ment of critical foreign assistance. Thus there is the likelihood 
of price spikes in critical areas, greatly complicating the calcu-
lation of the return on investment. 
3. The various CPA orders and rules are subject to "adoption or 
replacement" by a future, elected Iraqi government. It is not 
clear that such a future regime will be as enthusiastic about 
free market principles as the CPA. The "rules of the game" may 
change a number of times before finally stabilizing. This added 
uncertainly only adds to investor concerns. 
4. Because few of the important anticorruption checks are in place, 
the system is open to abuse: "It's creating riches in a crony way. We 
unfortunately have not departed from the old pattern where people 
used their personal ties, etc. in order to enrich themselves. Sharks 
from the old regime are taking advantage of what's going on." 15 
5. Finally, it is becoming readily apparent that the country is woe-
fully deficient in the critical entrepreneurial culture that is able 
to take advantage of the opportunities created by the neoliberal 
reforms: 
the locals constantly complained of a lack of gasoline, often citing 
it as evidence of the U.S. failure to fix things. Local U.S. com-
manders agonized over how to obtain some-even arranging to 
send trucks hundreds of miles to try to buy it. Thus it came as 
quite a shock when they discovered that local gas stations were 
sitting on top of tens of thousands of gallons. Why hadn't the 
owners opened? They were waiting word from Baghdad, and be-
sides, they explained, nobody had asked. 16 
Privatization Inappropriate at This Time 
By far the greatest criticism of the neoliberal reforms comes from 
those highly skeptical of the CPA's intended privatization of Iraqi 
SOEs. 17 The central rationale for privatization is that, left to its de-
vices, a privately owned enterprise is by definition more efficient 
that its publicly owned counterpart. This general proposition has 
been borne out by numerous emp!rical studies. i~ 
Based on the experience of the transition economies, privatization has 
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generally proved the most successful and the least controversial re-
form when it has been a low priority and is of a modest nature and 
the main emphasis has been on encouraging new start-up businesses. 
Thus the transition process so far has produced the best economic 
results in China, where, despite calls for immediate privatization, little 
has been accomplished, and in Poland, where privatization was under 
way for approximately five years before· anything substantial was 
accomplished. 19 
The Iraqi view on privatization draws largely on the experience of 
the transition economies, with emphasis on the immediate disloca-
tions associated with privatization. Ali Abdul-Amir Allawi notes that: 20 
• "This push to sell everything is.the political stance of economic 
fundamentalism. 
• "A plan based on ideology, not economics is, of course, natu-
rally wrong. 
· "By no means should we preserve all state-owned enterprises. 
But there are some sectors that are more natural for government 
involvement or rehabilitation. 
· "There are many cases where state ownership of companies has 
worked well. Just look at Malaysia and Singapore, which have 
been very successful." 
He also feels that using shock therapy could cause a backlash against 
foreign companies and, even worse, political instability. Abdu-Amir 
Allawi's views are of particular significance because they reflect those 
of many educated Iraqis. More important, they were expressed while 
he was the country's interim trade minister. 
Abbas Alnasrawi, 21 arguably the United States's leading expert on 
the Iraqi economy, also falls into this group of critics of the neoliberal 
reforms. He opposes privatization in Iraq (at least at this time) on the 
grounds that it would most likely divert investment funds away from 
new productive investment, simply replacing loc,al ownership with 
foreign ownership. In addition, he feels that because foreign capital 
is in a position to outbid local capital for the ownership of SOEs. 
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This in turn will induce the flight of Iraqi capital abroad, to the det-
riment of the Iraqi economy. 22 
A related issue is the manner in which even the discussion of 
privatization has introduced an element of uncertainty for all those 
associated with the country's SOEs-managers, workers, suppliers, 
and customers. Critics of the program contend that the effect has 
taken a huge tool on morale and productivity. Their point is that, 
given all of the other sources of insecurity plaguing the country, 
unnecessarily creating more by raising the privatization issue at 
this time is coun~erproductive in terms of strengthening the 
economy. 23 
There is also a high likelihood that if Iraqis were given the chance 
to vote, they would cancel the privatization program, opting in-
stead to protect local jobs. 24 It follows that potential investors in 
SOEs have no real assurance that when a government is elected in 
late 2005, the privatization program would not be reversed and prior 
sales invalidated. 25 There are other problems with privatization at 
this time. 26 
The goal of a rapid transition to a free market in Iraq must be 
tempered by the fact that most of the population is dependent on 
state handouts. Not only is the state Iraq's biggest employer, but the 
Iraqi people depend on a heavily subsidized system of inputs to in-
dustry and the inexpensive goods and services that result. In privatiz-
ing Iraq's industries, one would expect businesses to become profitable 
by raising prices or cutting costs or staff. The outcome could be un-
employment and inflation, a recipe for chaos. 
There is no effective legal system, and Iraqi state institutions are 
still not functioning-both of which the Russian experiment showed 
were needed for big structural reforms. 
A related issue surrounds the whole legality of the CPA' s privatization 
program. International law obligates an occupying power to respect 
the laws of the occupied country. At present there)s serious disagree-
ment between the CPA and its critics over which of the neoliberal 
reforms would and would not be authorized by international law. 
Alnasrawi, 27 for one, feels it is quite clear that the order to privatize 
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192 SOEs cannot be considered anything but the type of action inter-
national law prohibits. 
The Neolibera/ Mechanisms Made Inoperative by CPA Actions 
Critics of the neoliberal approach, as app~ied to the Iraqi situation, 
contend that the CPA has in effect relegated the economy to a low 
priority-coming in somewhere after security, de-Baathification, 28 and 
strict compliance with a myriad of contracting requirements. Add to 
this CPA errors and miscalculations, and the result has been the de-
velopment of a marketplace incapable of transmitting meaningful 
signals to investors. A few examples illustrate the problems that have 
been created when CPA decisions were made without considering their 
economic ramifications or the manner in which these actions might 
be construed by Iraqis. 
Markets have a hard time functioning when there is a sudden drop 
in demand. Yet this is what has occurred under the de-Baathification 
program. It is estimated that between 15,000 and 30,000 Iraqis, in-
cluding teachers, university professors, engineers, and security offic-
ers, lost their positions and pensions in May 2003. 29 In addition, 
Ambassador Paul Bremer' s decree to demobilize the army was issued 
at a time when 60-70 percent of the population was already unem-
ployed. Demobilizing the army increased the ranks of the unemployed 
by approximately 400,000. Given an average family size of four, this 
means reduced purchasing power and perhaps even destitution for 
1.6 million Iraqis. 30 
Similarly, markets do not perform their proper function in an en-
vironment of pervasive constraints on firm actions. Hiring practices 
and security concerns are an important factor behind the high un-
employment rate in Iraq. Instead of hiring many Iraqis, the CPA and 
coalition contractors are opting for foreign laborers at a much higher 
cost. Said Colonel Damon Walsh, head of the CPA's Procurement Of-
fice: "We don't want to overlook Iraqis, but we want to protect our-
selves. From a force-protection standpoint, Iraqis are more vulnerable 
to a bad guy influence." 31 
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. As noted above, markets underperform in situations of great un-
certainty over the availability of key inputs. Despite the sense of ur-
gency that accompanied President Bush's request for financial 
assistance, eight months later less than $2.8 billion of the $18.4 
billion Congress provided for reconstruction had been spent. Offi-
cials overseeing the massive reconstruction job cite security prob-
lems and cumbersome contracting procedures but acknowledge they 
are disappointed with the pace. Uncertainty over the availability of 
funding has resulted in high-risk premiums being added to many 
contracts. 
There is reason to believe that the price system will take years to 
operate efficiently in certain key areas of the economy. The sector 
most affected by this policy shift is agriculture. 32 The CPA's idea is 
that going to a free market system though reducing farm subsidies 
will force farmers to invest more of their own money as well as to 
have more of a stake in the outcome of their efforts. The CPA con-
tends that the strategy that aid groups have used for years-providing 
farmers with subsidized supplies-is all wrong. Instead the govern-
ment will now provide help in the form of technology and education 
and "the market will take care of the rest." 33 
The Iraqi retort is that farmers need time before being able to com-
pete with the rest of the world. Critics have noted that "In fixing 
electricity, you can build a powerhouse and the problem is solved. 
But in agriculture you have to change the culture and you don't do 
that overnight."34 A typical Iraqi farmer lamented, "We are afraid of 
the free economy. We don't understand it. If we grow crops, who will 
help us and who will buy it?" 35 This sentiment was reflected by 
Mohammed Abdul Hussein, director of the Kut chapter of the Gen-
eral Federation of Iraqi Farmers. He feels that the government's planned 
reduction in subsidies will force people to abandon agriculture: "If 
the government will not supply. seeds and fertilizer, the farmers, they 
will not farm." 36 Compounding. the problem in agriculture is the 
widely held view amongst Iraqis that they will not be able to compete 
with the foreign agribusinesses that are likely to set up operations in 
the country. Conspiracy theorists among them are advancing the ar-
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gument that the whole point of the neoliberal reforms is to disen-
franchise Iraqi farmers, making it easier for foreign exporters to cap-
ture these markets. This contention was given credibility by the fact 
that the CPA imported U.S. wheat after the war as it simultaneously 
destroyed Iraqi wheat because of its poor quality. 
Finally, firms need the expertise and resources to respond to the 
neoliberal market signals. Unfortunately a decision was made early 
on to ban Iraqi SOEs from reconstruction contracts funded by U.S. 
taxpayers. Apparently this decision was made for both legal and philo-
sophical reasons. The Coalition Provisional Authority was unclear on 
how U.S. regulations apply to a c~mpany that was owned by a rogue 
state that no longer exists. The CPA was also hoping to redistribute 
wealth and power in a country that was dominated by Saddam Hussein 
and his Baath Party loyalists. 37 
The problem is that practically every company of significance-
including those responsible for essential public works such as the 
electrical grid and telephone system-was owned by the government. 
Similarly, de-Baathification, pushed to the extreme, could backfire 
because the skilled technical and administrative people needed to 
rebuild Iraq turn out, inevitably, to have been party members. 38 In 
this context, all that neoliberal price signals do is create jobs and 
income for foreign workers and companies, hardly the foundation 
for a viable and dynamic domestic economy. 
In retrospect, de-Baathification was a costly overreaction that 
eroded Iraq's security and sent the economy into decline. Appar-
ently the CPA's intention was to bar around 20,000 members of 
Saddam Hussein's Baath Party from government jobs. Through an 
error of miscalculation, by the spring of 2004 nearly 400,000 
Baathists39 had been relieved of their jobs. As the enormity of the 
situation became apparent, the CPA began slowly reversing the de-
Baathification program, especially for lower-level party members. 40 
Unfortunately, the economic toll of de-Baathificatibn to both ag-
gregate supply and demand may take years to\c;wercome. Th~ lost 
good will of large segments of the educated Iraqi population may 
never be recouped. 




The Neoliberal Reforms, Especially Shock Therapy, Are 
Inappropriate for Transition Economies 
Although many economists, including Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, 41 
are highly skeptical of applying the neoliberal program at the start of 
market transformation, Stiglitz notes that transition economies face 
two broad alternatives in moving toward a market economy. One 
choice is shock therapy-quick privatization of state-owned assets and 
abrupt liberalization of trade policies and capital flows-while the 
other is gradual market liberalization to allow for the rule of law to 
be established. 42 -
To Stiglitz the historical record speaks for itself: shock therapy, at 
least at the level of microeconomic reforms, failed. However, those 
countries (Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia) that took the gradualist 
approach to privatization and the reconstruction of institutional in-
frastructure "managed their transitions far better than those that tried 
to leapfrog into a laissez-fair economy. Shock therapy countries saw 
incomes plunge and poverty soar. Social indicators, such as life ex-
pectancy, mirrored the dismal GDP numbers." 43 As for Iraq, Stiglitz 
notes that the transition economy lessons, together with the ongoing 
occupation, 
make quick privatization particularly problematic. The low prices that 
the privatized assets are likely to fetch will create the sense of an ille-
gitimate sell-off foisted on the country by the occupiers and their col-
laborators. Without legitimacy, any purchaser will worry about the 
security of his property rights, which will contribute to even lower 
prices. Furthermore, those buying privatized assets may then be reluc-
tant to invest in them; instead, as happened elsewhere, their efforts 
may be directed more at asset stripping than at wealth creation.44 
No doubt critics of the Stiglitz45 pqsition would contend that suc-
cess or failure of a transition economy can be traced to a multitude 
of factors, with no single factor (e.g., shock therapy) capable of ac-
' . 
counting for all the observed pat,terns of growth and development. 
For example, Berglof and Bolton have observed that transition econo-
mies appear prone to a pattern of cumulative circular phenomena 
where things tend to get better or worse instead of reaching a stable 
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equilibrium. Because of this tendency, a growing and deepening di-
vide has opened up between transition economies where economic 
development has taken off and those caught in a vicious cycle of 
institutional backwardness and macroeconomic instability. This gap 
or divide is visible in almost every measure of economic performance: 
GDP groWt:h, investment, government finances growth, income dis-
tribution, general institutional infrastructure, and increasingly in mea-
sures of financial development.16 
Berglof and Bolton suggest that even in the countries that have 
made it across the divide, like the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovenia, and the Baltic states 9f Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, a 
remarkable diversity of policies and financial development has been 
pursued. Clearly, shock therapy or any other set economic agenda is 
not a necessary and sufficient condition for success or failure. 
Assessment 
The neoliberal program in Iraq assumes that free markets and greater 
integration into the world economy should progressively lead to mac-
roeconomic stability, reduced government intervention, a dynamic 
private sector, and prosperity. Deregulated banking, privatization, and 
eventually the development of a functioning stock exchange should 
lay the foundation for competitive free markets. Eventual member-
ship in the WTO promises to reduce trade barriers, free circulation of 
capital, and strengthen civil society. While many currently inefficient 
firms will no doubt disappear, resources will shift to those areas in 
which the country has a comparative advantage. The end result will be 
high sustained rates of growth and employment generation. 
In part, some of the difficulties encountered by the neoliberal ap-
proach in Iraq stem from the way it is perceived. To noneconomists, 
neoliberalism does not appear to form a coherent strategy aimed at 
job creation and economic- recovery. Instead, the approach conveys 
the impression that most important decisions \,oncerning the alloca-
tion of resources are simply left to (capricious)' market chance, with 
resulting unchecked expenditures on nonessential items, increasing 
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disparity of incomes, and regional imbalances. If economic recovery 
and growth occur, it is more by chance than design. Unfortunately, 
the absence of a marked recovery or growth months after the intro-
duction of the reforms only confirms the skeptics' worst suspicions: 
In Iraq, without economic vision and realistic policies, the goodwill 
of spending efforts may end in chronic structural problems, high in-
flation, leading to political and social disturbances. As a matter of 
fact, since the :var ended, the implemented economic measures and 
the actual expenditures have neither increased domestic production 
and productive employment nor improved the living standards of the 
majority of the people. Moreover, the main structural problems have 
not eased.47 
In addition, to many Iraqis the failure of the neoliberal approach 
to deliver economically has lent credence to the conspiracy theory 
that neoliberalism is simply a mechanism introduced to shift the 
country's resources out of their hands and into the control of foreign 
interests. 
Objective critics of Iraq's neoliberal reforms contend that the mar-
ket conditions upon which it is based just do not exist in the couqtry 
at this time. 48 In particular, a culture of responding to market forces 
will have to be nurtured and developed. Until this occurs, the 
neoliberal program will continue to yield only higher rates of unem-
ployment and resentment. Advocates contend that the state has only 
to be removed from the sphere of the economy to see a vibrant free 
market appear. While experience of the transition economies sug-
gests that the issues surrounding neoliberalism and shock therapy 
are never this clear-cut, in Iraq's case it is apparent that all the uncer-
tainties associated with shock therapy in general, and with the 
privatization process in particular, are reason alone to rule out much 
hope for this strategy's success, at least in the near future. 
If not neoliberalism in its pure form, then what for Iraq? Dani 
Rodrik, one of the more perceptive contemporary development econo-
mists, provides several broad guldelines, based on the historical record 
of transition economies to date:\ 
Transitions to high economic growth are typically sparked by a rela-
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tively narrow range of policy changes and institutional reforms. In his 
opinion, in none of the success stories do we have the ambitious 
reforms recommended by the augmented Washington Consensus play-
ing an important role at the outset or as a prerequisite. 
The policy changes that initiate growth in transitions typically 
combine elements of orthodoxy with uI)conventional institutional 
innovations. 
Institutional innovations do not travel well. What works in one set-
ting often does not work in another. Gradualism (as opposed to shock 
therapy) worked well in India, but not the Ukraine. Clearly, success-
ful reforms are those that package sound economic principles around 
local capabilities, constraints, and opportunities. A major failure of 
the CPA program to date is not involving the Iraqis more in the de-
sign, implementation, and operation of a viable economic strategy. 49 
The real issue is whether some aspects of the neoliberal pro-
gram, themselves controversial, can be made to work as part of a 
alternative, comprehensive program of reconstruction and growth-
something along the lines of Berglof and Bolton's virtuous cycle, 
perhaps building on the banking reforms noted above. For its part, 
the unrest in Iraq in late 2003-early 2004 has caused the CPA to 
back away from two of its more ambitious initiatives, privatization 
and free market reforms50-the core of the neoliberal reforms. 
The new approach, U.S. diplomats said, calls into question the pros-
pects for initiatives touted by conservative strategists to fashion Iraq 
into a secular, pluralistic, market-driven nation. While the diplomats 
maintain those goals are still attainable .... ideology has become 
subordinate to the schedule. 51 
Does this mark the end to neoliberalism in Iraq? 
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